Florida DUI Traffic Stop? As a DUI defense attorney, I am often asked by my clients, “Can the police really pull me over for just swerving a little bit?” The answer, as demonstrated in the recent case of State of Florida v. Tommy Bozeman (2025), is a resounding no—at least not without very specific, articulable facts. I have spent my career at dui2go.com fighting to ensure that law enforcement follows the letter of the law, specifically the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution, which protect you against unreasonable searches and seizures.
In the Bozeman case, a judge in the 7th Judicial Circuit for Volusia County recently granted a motion to suppress all evidence because the initial traffic stop was deemed illegal. I find this case particularly compelling because it highlights the thin line between a “hunch” and “reasonable suspicion.” If you feel your stop was unjustified, I encourage you to learn more about me and how we approach these complex legal challenges.
What Constitutes a Legal Florida DUI Traffic Stop?

I want you to understand that for a police officer to legally pull you over, they generally need one of two things. First, they can have probable cause that a traffic violation occurred—such as speeding or running a red light. Second, they can have a founded suspicion (also known as reasonable suspicion) that criminal activity, such as driving under the influence, is afoot. This isn’t just my opinion; it is the standard set by the Florida Supreme Court in cases like Dobrin v. Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles.
In the Bozeman matter, the Florida DUI Traffic Stop officer claimed he was performing a “welfare check.” We see this often in DUI cases where the officer can’t point to a specific broken law. They claim they are worried about your safety to justify the stop. However, the court ruled that “ping-ponging” within a lane for an undetermined amount of time, without impacting other traffic or pedestrians, does not meet the legal threshold for a stop. If you’ve been arrested under similar circumstances, please reach out to us immediately to discuss your defense.
Understanding the “Community Caretaker” Doctrine

The police often rely on what we call the Community Caretaker Doctrine. This is a legal exception that allows officers to stop a vehicle without suspecting a crime if they believe it is necessary for public safety or to provide emergency aid. In my experience, this is where many “welfare checks” originate. The courts have identified three specific categories of Florida DUI Traffic Stops for this:
- The Emergency Aid Exception: (e.g., a driver slumped over the wheel).
- Automobile Impoundment/Inventory: (standard police procedure).
- The Public Servant Exception: (providing necessary assistance).
In the Bozeman case, the court applied the “Mitchell Test” from People v. Mitchell to see if the welfare check was valid. I’ve outlined how the court viewed the evidence in the table below to show you why the stop failed.
| Factor | Officer’s Claim | Court’s Finding |
| Emergency Need? | Driver was “swerving” and pulled into a hotel briefly. | No immediate need for protection of life or property. |
| Primary Motivation? | A “welfare check” to ensure driver safety. | Actions seemed more aligned with investigating a crime than aiding. |
| Scope of Action? | Following for 2.5 miles and then stopping. | The driving was “unremarkable” and did not warrant an emergency stop. |
Can Brief Lane Deviations Justify a Florida DUI Traffic Stop?
I frequently see officers cite Florida Statute 316.089(1), which requires drivers to stay within a single lane “as nearly as practicable.” However, I want you to know that the courts are very clear: it is not always possible to maintain a perfect line. In Crooks v. State, the court held that a brief lane deviation that doesn’t endanger others is not a crime.
In the Bozeman case, the driver moved from the right lane toward the left lane for a moment and then back. There were no other cars around. The judge noted that the officer’s dash-cam—which records the 30 seconds before the lights are turned on—showed absolutely nothing unusual. This is why I always scrutinize video evidence. If the “ping-ponging” isn’t on the video, we have a very strong argument that the officer was acting on a hunch rather than a fact.
Key Takeaway: “A driving pattern may be unusual without being erratic.” — State v. Fletcher. I use this precedent to protect my clients from stops based on minor, safe lane movements.
FAQ: Your Questions About Illegal Stops Answered

I have found that while continuous or extreme weaving can justify a Florida DUI Traffic Stop, minor drifting is usually not enough. In State v. Bozeman, the court ruled that because the officer couldn’t describe how many times the swerving happened or how long it lasted, the stop was illegal. If the officer calls it “ping-ponging” but the video doesn’t show it, we can challenge the stop.
You should be polite but realize that this is often a precursor to a DUI investigation. In the Bozeman case, the officer didn’t even ask the driver if he was okay before starting the DUI probe. This proved to me—and the court—that the “welfare check” was just a label used to bypass your constitutional rights. If this happened to you, contact us so we can review the officer’s testimony.
I often see officers argue that a driver was “evading” them by turning into a parking lot. However, the U.S. Supreme Court in Illinois v. Wardlow stated that only “headlong flight” is a consummate act of evasion. Simply pulling into a hotel parking lot and then back onto the road is not enough to give me or any other attorney a reason to believe you are committing a crime.
Yes, it matters a great deal. Many Florida statutes, including the one for failing to maintain a single lane, rely on whether your driving impacted the safety of others. If you are on an empty road at 1:10 am, like Mr. Bozeman was, and you drift slightly, there is no “safety hazard” to justify a Florida DUI Traffic Stop. We look at the “totality of the circumstances” to build your defense.
Comparing Successful vs. Unsuccessful Traffic Stops
To help you understand where your case might fall, I’ve put together a comparison of Florida DUI Traffic Stop cases. This shows the difference between driving that is just “unusual” and driving that is truly “erratic” enough to allow a stop.
| Case Name | Driving Behavior Observed | Result of Stop |
| State v. Bozeman | One brief lane deviation; “ping-ponging” not on video. | ILLEGAL (Evidence Suppressed) |
| Roberts v. State | Continuous weaving within a lane captured on dash-cam. | LEGAL |
| Yanes v. State | Crossing fog-line 3 times within a mile on the Turnpike. | LEGAL |
| Agreda v. State | Driving 45 MPH in a 65 MPH zone (slow speed only). | ILLEGAL |
| Jordan v. State | Minor drifting where no other vehicles were impacted. | ILLEGAL |
Why the “Bozeman” Victory Matters for Your Case
The judge’s order in State v. Bozeman is a victory for everyone I represent. It reinforces the idea that the police cannot use “welfare checks” as a blanket authority to conduct DUI investigations on motorists who are simply lost or driving in an “unremarkable” fashion. The judge noted that the driver’s first words were, “You were blinding me,” referring to the officer’s high SUV headlights. This provided a logical, non-criminal explanation for why the driver was switching lanes—he was trying to get away from the glare!
When I take on a case, I look for these details. Was the officer’s car too close? Did they record the driving? Did they actually ask if you were okay? If the answer is no, we may be able to file a Motion to Suppress, just like in this case, which can lead to all evidence—including breath tests and field sobriety exercises—being thrown out.
Resources for Further Research
I believe in an informed client. If you want to dive deeper into the Florida DUI Traffic Stop statutes and rules we use to defend you, I recommend visiting these official sites:
- The Florida Senate – Chapter 316 (State Uniform Traffic Control)
- Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure – Rule 3.190
- Justia – Florida Statutes and Case Law Search
Let Me Help You Protect Your Future

I know how stressful a DUI arrest can be, but the Bozeman case proves that the police are not always right. If you were stopped for swerving, a welfare check, or an “unusual” driving pattern, I want to hear your story. My team and I at dui2go.com are dedicated to holding law enforcement accountable to the Constitution.
Would you like me to review your Florida DUI Traffic Stop, police report and dash-cam footage to see if your traffic stop was illegal?
Contact us today to get started.
FULL TEXT OF OPINION
33 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 430a
STATE OF FLORIDA, v. TOMMY BOZEMAN, Defendant. County Court, 7th Judicial Circuit in and for Volusia County. Case No. 2025 105513 MMDB. Division 80. December 2, 2025. Bryan A. Feigenbaum, Judge.
ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS
THIS CAUSE having come before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, pursuant to Rule 3.190, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and Article 1, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution, and 901.15 Florida Statute (2022), and having heard testimony and argument, and after reviewing evidence and case law, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, the following findings are made:
Daytona Beach Shores Department of Public Safety Officer Carmin was on duty around 1:10 am. He was parked in his marked SUV car in such a manner as to observe any traffic passing him on the four-laned A1A in his city. He heard vehicle acceleration and thought a vehicle was possibly being driven over the speed limit. He then pulled out behind a convertible heading northbound. As he followed the same, as there were no other vehicles in the area, he saw the vehicle move over from the right lane into the left, or passing lane, by some distance but not fully over, and then go back to the right lane. No other traffic or pedestrian was around to be impacted. The police vehicle was driven close enough for the officer to read the license plate. The convertible then made a quick turn into a hotel parking lot on the right, or east, side of A1A. The officer noted that the vehicle pulled into the parking lot but did not park in a designated spot.
Off. Carmin decided not to pursue the matter, thinking the driver was parking for the night, and proceeded past going northbound. After passing the parking lot, he observed the same vehicle pulling back onto A1A and again proceeding northbound. Losing sight of the vehicle for just a few seconds, Off. Carmin did a U-turn so he could continue to follow behind the vehicle. There was no other traffic present.
As he followed the vehicle, he noticed the convertible continually swerving within the left lane, from the center lane to the right-hand lane. The officer described it as “ping-ponging” within the lane, but did not elaborate on how many times this happened, how long this went on for, nor if it was gradual or rapid. The vehicle switched lanes then to the right-hand lane and the officer followed the vehicle for another mile and a half. No other erratic driving was observed. The officer decided to put his lights and sirens on and make a traffic stop for a “welfare check”. Once he activated the lights and sirens, the dash-cam began recording and captured the prior thirty seconds and forward. No unusual driving was shown on the recording. The officer could have activated the dash-cam earlier without putting on his lights and sirens if he so chose. In total, Off. Carmin observed the Defendant driving for two and a half miles and saw the one brief lane deviation and some type of swerving for an indeterminate amount of time within the lane which was not captured by the dash-cam. Off. Carmin testified that he saw no other erratic driving and was not concerned about any danger posed to anyone else.
After the traffic stop, conversations and observations led to a DUI investigation and subsequent arrest. The only other witness was Sgt. Frank of the same agency. Sgt. Frank testified he was situated north of where the driving occurred but did see the driver pulling into the hotel parking lot while Off. Carmin passed by and seeing the same vehicle re-enter A1A northbound. Although he didn’t describe seeing the swerving within the lane, he testified there was a lane change, which he thought was unusual, and suspected the driver’s earlier actions to be an attempt to avoid law enforcement.
The Defendant’s first words upon being approached by Off. Carmin were that “you were blinding me”, referring to the officer’s headlights which sit much higher than the convertible that he was driving. Off. Carmin told the Defendant he got behind him since “. . . he was doing a little swerving”. Off. Carmin did not inquire whether the driver was feeling well, was tired, or if there were any mechanical issues with the convertible. Before starting the DUI investigation, Off. Carmin relayed to Sgt. Frank that he “saw him swerve a little bit” and then the driver switched lanes before he pulled into the hotel parking lot. Off. Carmin told Sgt. Frank that after the driver re-entered AIA, after the officer got behind him again, the driver again switched lanes but he did not mention anything about seeing him continuously swerving within the lane.
The defense argues there was no legal basis for the traffic stop, and thus the subsequent investigation and arrest should be suppressed. A traffic stop may be based on probable cause that a traffic violation occurred and the court should use an objective approach to make that determination. Dobrin v. Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 874 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 2004) [29 Fla. L. Weekly S275a]. Also, a traffic stop is justifiable if there is a “founded suspicion”, or reasonable suspicion, of criminal activity, such as driving under the influence, Florida Department of Motor Vehicles v. DeShong, 603 So.2d 1349, 1352 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), or that the driver may be ill, tired, impaired, or that there are vehicle mechanical defects. See Ndow v. State, 864 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) [29 Fla. L. Weekly D321a]. (The driver, at 2 a.m., was stopped at a green light for the light’s entire cycle, then slowed down to not pass the police officer, then pulled over and occupants were changing places). “. . . [A] legitimate concern for the safety of the motoring public can warrant a brief investigatory stop to determine whether a driver is ill, tired, or driving under the influence in situations less suspicious than that required for other types of criminal behavior.” DeShong, id. at 1352.
There are police-citizen contacts involving automobiles where there is not a law enforcement belief of a criminal law violation. The police community caretaker function is “. . . totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. The community caretaker function [is] recognized as an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S. Ct. 2523 (1973); State v. Perez, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 35a (Fla. 11th Jud. Cir., Miami-Dade County Cir. Ct. Oct. 5, 2004), and State v. Madzel, 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 501a (Fla. 7th Jud. Cir., Flagler County Ct. March 1, 2013). “Under the community caretaker doctrine, an officer may stop a vehicle without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity if the stop is necessary for public safety and welfare. . . . Even a stop pursuant to an officer’s community caretaker responsibilities, however, must be based on specific articulable facts showing that the stop was necessary for the protection of the public.” Majors v. State, 70 So. 3d 655, 661 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) [36 Fla. L. Weekly D1355a], citing to Castella v. State, 959 So. 2d 1285, 1292 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) [32 Fla. L. Weekly D1784a]. The three recognized subdivisions to the community caretaker doctrine are: (1) the emergency aid exception, (2) the automobile impoundment/inventory exception, and (3) the public servant exception. See Perez, id.
None of these exceptions are applicable in this case. If “welfare check” is to be interpreted as falling under the emergency aid exception, there have to be sufficient facts. A good guideline is the three part test articulated in People v. Mitchell, 347 N.E. 2d 607, 609 (N.Y. 1976): (1) Was there an objectively reasonable basis for a belief in the immediate need for police assistance for the protection of life or property?; (2) Were the officer’s actions motivated by an intent to aid or protect, rather than solve a crime?; and (3) Do the police actions fall within the scope of the emergency?
This is not a case where a driver is slumped over behind the wheel of a car with the motor running. See Perez, id.; Madzel, id.; and Danielewicz v. State, 730 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) [24 Fla. L. Weekly D793a]. There are some unusual driving moments but nothing that rises to the level of an emergency concern.
Driving outside the lane of travel for a brief moment is not by itself enough to violate the failing to drive in a single lane statute. No other vehicles or pedestrians were impacted. See Section 316.089 (1), Florida. Statutes (2015); Crooks v. State, 710 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) [23 Fla. L. Weekly D1323b]; Jordan v. State, 831 So. 2d 1241, 1243 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) [27 Fla. L. Weekly D2651a] (“[I]t is not practicable, perhaps not even possible, for a motorist to maintain a single lane at all times and that the crucial concern is safety rather than precision.”); Peterson v. State, 264 So. 3d 1183 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) [44 Fla. L. Weekly D641a]; and State v. Taylor, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 397b (Fla. 7th Jud. Cir., Volusia County Ct. Jan. 13, 2011).
Driving into a hotel parking lot at night for a brief moment or two, even if not pulling into a designated parking spot, is not so unusual as to constitute an emergency concern. A driver may be lost or may be pulling over to respond to a text or phone call. It is true that it may also be indicative of an effort to get away from a police officer and could have been a factor in other situations, but this was stated to be a “welfare check” stop. The driving pattern here does not fit a “headlong flight” scenario which the United States Supreme Court has deemed “the consummate act of evasion.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 121, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000). “Additionally, when a vehicle drives away from the scene “in an unremarkable fashion,” the act of leaving the scene is not likely to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Majors, id. at 660, citing to Hill v. State, 51 So. 3d 649, 651 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) [36 Fla. L. Weekly D170b].
While continuous swerving within a lane can justify a traffic stop, there were insufficient details as far as how long or pronounced was this swerving. “Ping-ponging” within a lane can mean a lot of different things and the dash-cam footage certainly did not convey any concerning swerving. The officer’s initial summary to his fellow officer did not relay any swerving and the other officer, who was watching the vehicle approach his direction, testified he saw a lane switch but did not mention any swerving. There were no allegations of non-compliance with the posted speed limit, any sudden unusual changes in speed, nor unexplained delay at a traffic light. See Agreda v. State, 152 So. 3d 114 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) [39 Fla. L. Weekly D2516a] (the driver going 45 MPH in a 65 MPH zone was not enough on its own to justify a stop for a police officer’s community care function); State v. Ledo, 27 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 537a (Fla. 7th Jud. Cir., St. Johns County Ct. Aug.7, 2019); Harapas v. State of Florida, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 989a (Fla. 7th Jud. Cir. Ct., Aug. 4, 2014), and State v. Fletcher, 24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 545a (Fla. 7th Jud. Cir., Volusia County Ct. June 21, 2016) (“A driving pattern may be unusual without being erratic.”).
Contrast the instant fact pattern with the following cases: Roberts v. State, 732 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) [24 Fla. L. Weekly D533a] (the driver’s continuous weaving within a lane was captured by the dash-cam and the officer had a reasonable suspicion of an impaired driver); Yanes v. State, 877 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) [29 Fla. L. Weekly D1282a] (the officer saw the driver, on the Florida Turnpike, cross the fog-line three times within a mile, each time by about one-half of its width, thus believing the driver was impaired, sick, or tired and, also, the deviation outside the lane was a violation of the single lane statute since the driving was by more then what was practicable); Esteen v. State, 503 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (after midnight, the driver was seen on I-95 going 45 MPH and “weaving within the lane, executing an S shape up the Interstate”); Bailey v. State, 319 So. 2d 22, 26 (Fla. 1975) (“Because of the dangers inherent to our modern vehicular mode of life, there may be justification for the stopping of a vehicle by a patrolman to determine the reason for its unusual operation.”; the driver was only going 45 MPH on the Florida Turnpike and weaving from one side to the other); State v. Carrillo, 506 So. 2d.495 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (at 2 a.m., the driver was weaving in an extreme manner within a lane, in excess of five times within one-quarter of a mile, thus officer believed the driver was intoxicated); Davidson v. State [Editor’s note: State v. Davidson], 744 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) [24 Fla. L. Weekly D2511a] (the driver was going between 40 and 50 MPH where there was a 70 MPH speed limit, and drifting in and out of the lane, jerking the vehicle back in a correcting manner, creating a reasonable suspicion of impairment); DeShong, id. (the driver was using the lane markers to position his vehicle and, for no apparent reason, abruptly slowed from 55 to 30 MPH and then accelerated rapidly so the officer had founded suspicion that this erratic driving was indicative of driver impairment or vehicle malfunction); State v. Vinci, 146 So. 3d 1255 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) [39 Fla. L. Weekly D1970c] (within a mile, the driver continually went from the right side of the lane to the other, hitting reflectors, and then switched lanes and left his turn sign blinking, creating reasonable suspicion of impairment). DeSouza v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 30 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 544b (Fla. 18th Jud. Cir. Ct. Oct. 18, 2022) (on multiple occasions, the driver both swerved within his lane and left his lane of travel, including into the center turn lane; the stop was warranted under the community caretaker doctrine and, reflecting that, the officer asked the driver if there was something mechanically wrong with the vehicle or if the driver was having a medical issue to explain the swerving); and Baden v. State, 174 So. 3d 494, 497 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) [40 Fla. L. Weekly D1913b] (at 2 a.m., the driver repeatedly hit a curb, while riding alongside a pedestrian, causing the person to flinch, and the officer feared an accident.) (“What establishes one’s driving as ‘erratic’ is determined on a case-by-case basis as there is no statutory definition of erratic driving.”).
The fact that a vehicle switched lanes in and of itself is not necessarily erratic. A convertible driver might not like higher level headlights in his or her rear-view and side mirrors. Both times the convertible switched lanes, it was when the first officer was behind him; the first time when he got close enough to read the license plate. The Defendant, even before being questioned, stated that he was being blinded by the officer’s lights.
A “welfare concern” should not be invoked so broadly as to cloak what may otherwise be a hunch that a driver is impaired. See Bell v. State of Florida, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 354a (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. April 10, 2002) (“This Court will not grant police officers blanket authority to conduct investigatory stops for DUI, by virtue of a ‘well-being check’, on motorists who are simply lost, unfamiliar with the vicinity, or pose no danger to surrounding traffic.”); Callaghan v. State of Florida, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 04-20192-CINS (Fla. 7th Jud. Cir., Cir. Ct. Sept. 17, 2004); State v. Rohde, 864 N.W.2d 704, 709 (Neb. App. 2015) (“The [community caretaker] exception should be narrowly and carefully applied in order to prevent its abuse.”); and State v. Wright, 28 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 618a (Fla. 7th Jud. Cir., Flagler County Ct. Aug. 31, 2020). Even considering the driving pattern in its totality, there was insufficient evidence of erratic driving to justify the traffic stop for a “welfare check”.
Additionally, Off. Carmin’s report and testimony claimed this was a “welfare check” and was not based on a well-founded or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. If the traffic stop was for that latter reason, the Court would have examined the totality of the circumstances surrounding the detention and would have considered relevant factors which includes “the time of day; the appearance and behavior of the suspect; the appearance and manner of operation of any vehicle involved; and anything incongruous or unusual in the situation as interpreted in light of the officer’s knowledge” to analyze whether this was more than “[a] hunch or mere suspicion”. Huffman v. State, 937 So. 2d 202, 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) [31 Fla. L. Weekly D2227a] (citing to other cases). See also Faunce v. State, 884 So. 2d 504, 506 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) [29 Fla. L. Weekly D2251b].
Based on all the evidence and case law, balancing the public’s right to be free from overbroad traffic stops and law enforcement’s ability to protect the public, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Motion to Suppress is GRANTED and the evidence flowing from the traffic stop is inadmissible.










