DUI News, Tampa

Avoiding Amalie Arena DUI | Stanley Cup Playoffs | 813-222-2220

Amalie Arena

Stanley Cup DUI Tampa
DUI For Visitors to Stanley Cup Playoffs

DUI For Visitors to Stanley Cup Playoffs


Since the site of the Stanley Cup Playoffs is in Tampa, Florida there will be an influx of activity and people. Also, the Tampa Police Department’s intensive DUI enforcement zone is in the heart of Tampa near Amalie Arena. So here is a map of where visitors can expect to see tons of traffic enforcement officers.


Link to Interactive Map: 

DUI Officers Watch Bar Parking Lots.

“Tips to watch locations come from Phone Calls from Bar Managers, letters, pictures”


Tampa is well known for the tactical use of special teams to conduct traffic stops near sporting events and bars. In addition, a former Tampa Police Department Sergeant gives testimony in Tampa Bay police tactics in this video. This former sergeant won’t be working but there are plenty more just waiting to arrest people.


 

Stanley Cup Tampa Police Department DUI Unit
DUI For Visitors to Stanley Cup Playoffs

 


The Channelside area will be the focus of the DUI Tampa traffic cops. Assume they watch and wait at parking lots, act on tips received by phone and other types of electronic messages. The police often receive tips to watch locations from phone calls, text messages, emails, letters, and photos. Furthermore, a former DUI specialist said during the final testimony as a Tampa law enforcement officer, “I get all kinds of stuff.”


Assume this is also the practice everywhere: Pinellas, Pasco, as well as Hillsborough counties in Florida. In addition, one DUI attorney has said if “there was a basis for the traffic stop and probable cause for the arrest, how or why an officer got involved in a DUI stop is irrelevant.” Be advised.



To Learn More See: Tampa DUI Bars and Restaurants – Map of Hot Spots – Amalie Arena DUI Attorney Tampa


According to Wikipedia, “The Stanley Cup (French: La Coupe Stanley) is the championship trophy awarded annually to the National Hockey League (NHL) playoff winner after the conclusion of the Stanley Cup Finals.” According to our research, the Tampa Police Department will be trying to score some points in a variety of contests to encourage enforcement of Florid’a DUI laws.


Amalie Arena and Florida Drivers are Targets in Law Enforcement Contests  – DUI Arrest Quotas, Contests, and Prizes

As we have reported, “The State of Florida encourages law enforcement again this year by holding an Olympic-like contest in Orlando. A photo in the report had a cop on foot running behind a traffic patrol motorcycle. This contest kept statistics and awarded performance based on statistical analysis of annual numbers of traffic enforcement actions. They call it the Florida Law Enforcement Challenge. Prizes were awarded for “inventive approaches” to traffic law enforcement.”

To Learn More About Tampa DUI Arrest Contests See:

www.dui2go.com/2014/09/florida-duiarrestcontest-costs-1720000.html

 

Rating: 4.9 – ‎Review by Google+

 

Sep 24, 2014 – Read the complete DUI Arrest Contest Winners story here: … DUI Arrest Contests, Driving under the influence ( DUI ), Arrest Contest … contests


Law Office of W.F. "Casey" Ebsary, Jr., 2102 W Cleveland St, Tampa, Florida 33606, United States (US) - Phone: (813) 222-2220 Email: centrallaw@gmail.com
DUI News

Sleeping DUI Driver: Can A Sleeping Driver Be Charged With DUI In Florida?

What happens to a driver arrested for DUI while asleep (Sleeping DUI Driver) in a lawfully parked car in Florida?

An arrest for DUI is a warrantless seizure, but it must be supported by evidence sufficient to justify the intrusion of a driver’s privacy rights under the Florida Constitution. Driving under influence charges usually arises when the cops see a bad driver on the road. But what happens to a driver arrested for DUI while asleep in a lawfully parked car in Tampa Florida? The answer is complex but simply put: The officer must use the “community caretaking function”, to justify a vehicle intrusion. The officer must claim the interests of the driver’s safety warranted the interaction with the driver.
Source: Hans FLW Supp 2304 (Cir Court Nov 2015).


What happens when a sleeping driver’s DUI arrest is not justified by the “community caretaking function”?

Search and seizure laws apply to DUI investigations in Florida and throughout the United States. The legal term for events surrounding a DWI / Driving under influence is “Detention”. To detain a driver, the officer must have “reasonable suspicion” to bother the driver. Frequently we see cases where the soon-to-be defendant has done the right thing (almost), and pulled over to take a nap in a legal parking space. Where the driver is found asleep, in a lawfully parked vehicle, the cop must have more to justify further investigation.

Cops cannot just open the vehicle door, take the keys from defendant’s hand, and wake up the dozing driver. Cops must try to arouse the driver. Perhaps a simple polite knock on the door or window is necessary. If they just open the door and enter, the detention of the DUI defendant is unlawful. At least one court has ruled that a DWI officer’s conduct was not justified by the “community caretaking function”. This cop never tried to wake the driver, opened the door, and did nothing to “indicate concern for defendant’s safety or to determine if she needed assistance.” The case was thrown out when a Fourth Amendment motion to suppress was granted.

Source: Hans FLW Supp 2304 (Cir Court Nov 2015).


What Happens When A Cop Approaches A Sleeping DUI Driver?

Actual Physical Control, Sleeping Driver, DUI, Probable Cause
“The Defendant had done nothing illegal. He had pulled off the road in a proper fashion and had not affected other traffic. He was able to roll down his window and respond to the officer”

The Facts:

    • Deputy approaches the legally parked car
    • Makes an approach to vehicle
    • The second approach to vehicle
    • Deputy parks patrol car behind the suspect
    • The driver has GPS on the dash
    • DUI cop has a “hunch” driver is DUI
    • Arrests driver

The Ruling:

Court found insufficient basis for a DUI investigation.

The Reasons:

One commentator has observed, “Deputy had legitimate reason to pull alongside defendant’s vehicle, which was stopped on roadside at night in isolated location, to conduct wellness check — Fact that deputy shone flashlight into vehicle and told defendant to roll down window did not convert encounter into investigatory stop — Where deputy saw that defendant was alert and conscious and defendant responded to inquiry about his well-being, deputy’s subsequent actions of parking patrol vehicle behind defendant’s vehicle with lights activated and directing defendant to turn off vehicle and provide identification was unlawful investigatory stop — Motion to suppress is granted.” 24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 829a

Can a Sleeping Driver be charged with DUI in Florida? Yes but the cop must have a valid reason to initiate contact with the driver. Quotes from a Recent Actual Physical Control Sleeping DUI Driver Court Opinions


Valid Stop For Probable Cause Or Concern For Motoring Public Safety

“In most DUI cases, a traffic stop is made because the officer has probable cause that a traffic infraction has occurred or the officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See State v. Wimberly, 988 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) [33 Fla. L. Weekly D1856a] and Origi v. State, 912 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) [30 Fla. L. Weekly D2302a]. There is also a justifiable reason for a traffic stop if there is “. . . a legitimate concern for the safety of the motoring public [which] can warrant a brief investigatory stop to determine whether a driver is ill, tired, or driving under the influence in situations less suspicious than that required for other types of criminal behavior.” State, Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. DeShong, 603 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).”

A Hunch Is Not Enough For A DUI Investigation

“Once Dep. Woell saw that the Defendant was conscious and able to make a response to his inquiry regarding whether he was all right, even if it was poorly done, there should have been more of an effort to discern if there was truly a concern for the Defendant’s safety before taking the next steps. The Defendant had done nothing illegal. He had pulled off the road in a proper fashion and had not affected other traffic. He was able to roll down his window and respond to the officer, albeit incoherently in the Deputy’s view. There was no visible injury, no blood or vomit. The Defendant was alert and conscious. Tellingly, the Deputy said, while being cross-examined, that he saw (from a decent distance) that the Defendant had bloodshot eyes (the cause of which could be from many reasons) and that he had a hunch the driver was impaired.”

Officer Must Have A Reasonable Suspicion For A DUI Investigation

“[T]he second approach (by parking behind the Defendant, walking up to the driver’s door, and directing him to turn off the car and to provide identification) as not a true welfare check. If he had made more than one inquiry while he was alongside the Defendant, perhaps raised his voice one time to try to get a clearer response, or articulated with more specificity how this particular driver looked to be in some possible distress, this Court’s conclusion may have been different. It would be a slippery slope to give an officer carte blanche to use a well-being concern to get around the need for a reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop.”
“Based on the circumstances and the case law, IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is GRANTED.”

Complete Sleeping Driver Actual Physical Control DUI Court Opinion


STATE OF FLORIDA, Plaintiff, vs. ROBERT CODY NANCARROW Defendant. County Court, 7th Judicial Circuit in and for Volusia County. Case No. 2016-301820-MMDB, Division 80. October 16, 2016. Bryan A. Feigenbaum, Judge. Counsel: Andrew Draper, Assistant State Attorney, for Plaintiff. G. Kipling Miller, Koleilat & Miller, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
THIS CAUSE came before the Court on September 14, 2016 for a hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence pursuant to Rule 3.190 Fla. R. Crim. P.; the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; and Article 1, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution. The Court, having taken notice of the court file, having listened to the testimony of the witnesses, and having considered the arguments from counsel, makes the following findings upon which it enters this Order:
On the late evening of February 14, 2016, around 11 p.m., Deputy Woell of the Volusia County Sheriff’s Office was driving westbound on the 1800 block of Taylor Road. This is a dark area in unincorporated Volusia County; there are no businesses or private homes alongside the road and there are no streetlights around.
There is a long bend in this stretch of road and as Dep. Woell was following a line of two or three cars near this curve, one car pulled completely off the road and onto the grassy shoulder. There was no other abnormal driving pattern and this maneuver did not affect the other vehicles. There was no testimony that any of the other vehicles had to brake or swerve.
Dep. Woell pulled alongside the stopped car, between the wood line and the passenger side of the car. He did not turn on his police siren or any flashing lights and did not get on a public address system. There was only one occupant, the driver, who turned out to be the Defendant. Dep. Woell said he pulled over out of a concern for the motorist to make sure everything was all right.
According to Dep. Woell, as he looked over at the Defendant, the Defendant was just staring straight ahead. The Deputy thought it unusual that a driver would not acknowledge his presence, seeing as how he was in a marked police car, so he pointed a flashlight into the car. At that time, the Defendant rolled down the passenger’s side window and stared at the police officer. Dep. Woell asked if he was okay and he claimed the Defendant looked down to the passenger’s side floorboard area and said something incoherent. Dep. Woell noted that the Defendant was alert, conscious, and was not slumped over and the Deputy made no mention of seeing any visible injury. On cross-examination, Dep. Woell also testified he saw that the Defendant had bloodshot eyes and that he had a hunch the Defendant might be impaired. He conceded that there were no other signs of impairment.
In order to explain his subsequent actions, Dep. Woell claimed that his original concerns for the driver had not dissipated. Dep. Woell thought, without clearly articulating why, that the Defendant was acting in an abnormal manner. He mentioned several scenarios he had been involved in, including situations where a driver was having a panic attack, an adverse reaction to medication, or a medical emergency such as a stroke, but never linked any prior experience with this particular driver’s behavior.
The Defendant testified that he pulled off the road since he was lost. He was staring at the UPS navigation system set up in the middle of his dashboard when a car pulled alongside him and someone shined a flashlight into his car and yelled for him to roll down his window. Once he complied, he was asked if he was okay and he replied that he was fine. He surmises he did not say it loud enough to be clearly heard.
Dep. Woell decided to put his vehicle in reverse and now park behind the Defendant’s car. He did not put on any takedown or flashing lights, but did turn on rear flashing blue lights to warn other traffic of his presence and they most likely would have been noticeable by the Defendant on this dark road. As the Deputy approached the driver’s side window, the window was already rolled down. Dep. Woell asked the Defendant to turn off his car and to provide his driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. Dep. Woell said he began noticing several signs of impairment including the odor of alcohol, glassy eyes, and slurred speech. The Defendant had a great deal of difficulty in finding his driver’s license. He claimed he could not find his wallet three times before realizing he had his wallet on him.
The Deputy returned to his own vehicle and began running the information, including performing a warrants check. According to the police reports, the first time of contact with the driver was at 11:10 p.m. Having now seen signs of impairment which led him to believe a DUI investigation was appropriate, Dep. Woell called for back-up at 11:28 p.m. The shift supervisor, Sgt. Amendolare, arrived about 10 minutes later, at 11:39 p.m., and the DUI investigation began.
Dep. Woell had the experience and background to have started the DUI investigation on his own, but testified several factors led him to call for assistance for safety reasons: the dark area where the two vehicles were parked and the bend in the road next to where they were located; the lack of a flat surface to conduct field sobriety exercises [FSEs] except for the road itself since the grassy shoulder was sloped downward; the need for another police car to block traffic if they were going to do FSEs at the scene; and the relative size of the Defendant compared to Dep. Woell.
The defense argues that there was an improper seizure along the side of the road first by shining the flashlight into the Defendant’s car and then by parking behind the car and approaching the driver’s side window and making direct commands. Secondly, the defense argues that even if there was a valid stop, there was an unlawful detention given the time between the first contact and when the DUI investigation began, around 28 minutes later.
The State initially argued that the defense did not present evidence to show standing and that they did not meet their initial burden of proof under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190 (g)(3) which requires, in a motion to suppress, “. . . the defendant shall present evidence supporting the defendant’s position and the state may offer rebuttal evidence.”
The Court took judicial notice of the court file and the allegations in the motion to suppress to find that there was no search warrant issued in this case. See Fla. Stat. § 90.202(6) (court may take judicial notice of the court file). Once that finding is made, the burden is the on the prosecution to prove the validity of the police’s actions under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Hinton, 305 So. 2d 804 (4th DCA 1975); State v. Schubert, 23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 782a (Fla. 17th Jud. Cir., Broward Co. Ct., Dec. 12, 2015); and State v. Dawkins, Donaldson, et al, 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 170a (Fla. 4th Jud. Cir., Duval Co. Ct., Oct. 23, 2012).
All warrantless searches “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The burden is on the State to prove the validity of a search by clear and convincing evidence. State v. Thompson, 72 So. 3d 245 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) [36 Fla. L. Weekly D2236a].
Did Dep. Woell make proper initial contact with the Defendant and, if that was characterized as an encounter, when did that contact change from an encounter to an investigatory stop? Was there a legitimate reason for that change in status at the time it became an investigatory stop?
The Florida Supreme Court described three distinct types of police-citizen contacts and they are often fluid situations. “The first level is considered a consensual encounter and involves only minimal police contact. During a consensual encounter a citizen may either voluntarily comply with a police officer’s requests or choose to ignore them. Because the citizen is free to leave during a consensual encounter, constitutional safeguards are not invoked.” Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185, 186 (Fla. 1993). The second level is “an investigatory stop.” See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). For a police officer to lawfully detain a citizen, “an investigatory stop requires a well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Mere suspicion is not enough to support a stop.” Popple, Id. at 186. The third level “involves an arrest which must be supported by probable cause that a crime has been or is being committed.” Id.
The fact that Dep. Woell pulled alongside the Defendant’s parked car did not automatically create a traffic stop. See State v. Wimbush, 668 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) [21 Fla. L. Weekly D506b] and State v. Carley, 633 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). He did not use lights or siren and in no manner direct the Defendant to pull over.
In most DUI cases, a traffic stop is made because the officer has probable cause that a traffic infraction has occurred or the officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See State v. Wimberly, 988 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) [33 Fla. L. Weekly D1856a] and Origi v. State, 912 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) [30 Fla. L. Weekly D2302a]. There is also a justifiable reason for a traffic stop if there is “. . . a legitimate concern for the safety of the motoring public [which] can warrant a brief investigatory stop to determine whether a driver is ill, tired, or driving under the influence in situations less suspicious than that required for other types of criminal behavior.” State, Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. DeShong, 603 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
Moreover, a police officer has a responsibility to make a well-being check if there is a reason to be concerned for the safety of a citizen, whether they are in a car or not. “It is well recognized that police officers may conduct welfare checks and that such checks are considered consensual encounters that do not involve constitutional implications.” Dermio v. State, 112 So. 3d 551, 555 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) [38 Fla. L. Weekly D776a]. See also Blice v. State, 825 So. 2d 447, 449 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) [27 Fla. L. Weekly D1705a] (“Not knowing whether he was ill, intoxicated, or merely asleep, the officers were duty-bound to investigate and to render assistance if needed. To do otherwise would be a dereliction of their duty.”); Gentles v. State, 50 So. 3d 1192, 1198-9 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) [35 Fla. L. Weekly D2900a] (“In keeping with such community caretaking responsibilities, [an officer] could properly check the defendant’s status and condition to determine whether he needed any assistance or aid. This type of limited contact has been deemed a reasonable and prudent exercise of an officer’s duty to protect the safety of citizens.”, citing to Lightbourne v. State, 438 So. 2d 380, 388 (Fla. 1983)); Greider v. State, 977 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) [33 Fla. L. Weekly D949b]; Vitale v. State, 946 So. 2d 1220, 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) [32 Fla. L. Weekly D164a] (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid . . . .”, citing to Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978); and State v. Sooy, 13 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 997b (Fla. 7th Jud. Cir., Volusia Cty. Ct., Aug. 3, 2006).
The facts in the instant case, like the fact patterns in Greider, Gentles, and Dermio, show an encounter continuum between an officer and a defendant. Given the time of night and the isolated location where the Defendant pulled off the road, Dep. Woell had a legitimate reason, if not a duty, to pull alongside the Defendant and make sure everything was all right. A wide gamut of reasons from the minor to the serious could be involved when a driver pulls off the road: mechanical problems with the vehicle, a medical emergency, wanting to take or make a phone call or respond to a text, a lost contact lens, or being lost and wanting to get one’s bearings are just a few of the possibilities.
Shining a flashlight into the vehicle or even telling the Defendant to roll down the window did not necessarily convert the initial encounter into an investigatory stop. See Dermio, id; Wimbush, id.; State v. Goodwin, 36 So. 3d 925 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) [35 Fla. L. Weekly D1289b]; Blake v. State, 939 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) [31 Fla. L. Weekly D2510a]; Pacheco v. State, 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 255a (Fla. 17th Jud. Cir. Ct., Nov. 9, 2012); and State v. Evans, 21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 451a (Fla. 18th Jud. Cir., Brevard Cty. Ct., Jan. 28, 2014).
Once Dep. Woell saw that the Defendant was conscious and able to make a response to his inquiry regarding whether he was all right, even if it was poorly done, there should have been more of an effort to discern if there was truly a concern for the Defendant’s safety before taking the next steps. The Defendant had done nothing illegal. He had pulled off the road in a proper fashion and had not affected other traffic. He was able to roll down his window and respond to the officer, albeit incoherently in the Deputy’s view. There was no visible injury, no blood or vomit. The Defendant was alert and conscious. Tellingly, the Deputy said, while being cross-examined, that he saw (from a decent distance) that the Defendant had bloodshot eyes (the cause of which could be from many reasons) and that he had a hunch the driver was impaired.
The State relied on Dermio, id., but there are many distinguishing factors that led the Second DCA to find that opening the driver’s door, in that case, did not transform that encounter into a stop. The driver/defendant, in that case, was parked in a bar parking lot at 3:30 a.m. with the engine running and the lights on. The driver appeared to be asleep and was only awakened by the officer’s tapping a flashlight onto the car window. The officer made three distinct attempts to get a coherent response from the driver before taking the further action of opening the door out of a concern for the driver’s safety. As pointed out in Dermio, “. . . the deputy’s concern for Dermio’s safety, in this case, had not yet been alleviated because Dermio continued to be incoherent and ‘out of it’.” [emphasis added] Id. at 556. Dep. Woell, by contrast, had just seen the Defendant driving properly and only made one attempt to check on his welfare. As mentioned earlier, there are a plethora of legitimate reasons why a driver may pull over in the same manner as the Defendant.
In Greider, id., an officer approached a legally parked car that had towels covering both the passenger and driver’s windows of the car, concealing the interior as if they were curtains. The officer had a safety concern and approached the passenger’s side to see the occupant(s). The driver rolled down the passenger’s window and said all was fine. Even though his concern for the occupant’s welfare was dispelled, the officer went around to the driver’s side and ordered the driver to roll down that window. “We do not ignore [the officer’s] testimony that he possessed suspicions regarding the unusual circumstances of the towels covering the windows, even after he had been assured all was well. However, a suspicion, by itself, may reflect well on the officer’s instincts but it does not meet the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of ‘at least reasonable suspicion that the individual seized is engaged in wrongdoing.’ Here, there was no evidence of criminal activity. This event was a second level citizen encounter, an investigatory stop, undertaken without appropriate legal justification.” Greider, id. at 793, citing to Popple at 186. Even if Dep. Woell had not had his welfare concern completely dispelled, there should have been a greater effort made, at least further inquiry, before pulling behind the Defendant’s car, blue warning lights illuminating the dark road, approaching the driver’s window, instructing him to turn off his engine, and making requests for license and registration. Just like the defendant in Greider, the Defendant here would not feel free to disregard the officer’s command, end the encounter, and drive away. The Florida Supreme Court “. . . has consistently held that a person is seized if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude that he or she is not free to end the encounter and depart.” Popple, id. at 188, citing to Jacobson v. State, 476 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1985).
In Gentles, id., an officer approached a parked car in a closed mall parking lot inhabited by a driver who appeared asleep. The car’s engine was running. The officer awakened the driver and ordered him to turn off the engine. The Fourth DCA found that the officer had not shown a reasonable concern for the driver’s safety before telling him to shut off the car. While the officer had a community caretaker function that could allow him to see if the driver needed any assistance, there has to be a specific concern, as opposed to a generalized concern, for the driver’s safety to allow this encounter to continue with greater intrusion by the officer. Id., at 1199-1200.
Dep. Woell’s testimony causes concern that he made the second approach (by parking behind the Defendant, walking up to the driver’s door, and directing him to turn off the car and to provide identification) as not a true welfare check. If he had made more than one inquiry while he was alongside the Defendant, perhaps raised his voice one time to try to get a clearer response, or articulated with more specificity how this particular driver looked to be in some possible distress, this Court’s conclusion may have been different. It would be a slippery slope to give an officer carte blanche to use a well-being concern to get around the need for a reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop. “. . . [I]nvestigatory stops based solely upon an inarticulable hunch or unparticularized suspicion are invalid.” Keeling v. State, 929 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) [31 Fla. L. Weekly D1569a].
Based on the finding that the second contact between Dep. Woell and the Defendant was an investigatory stop and not an encounter, the issue about the time of the Defendant’s detention on the side of the road before the back-up arrived to begin the DUI investigation is moot.
Based on the circumstances and the case law,
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is GRANTED.
Source: 24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 829a
DUI News

DUI Traffic Stop Motion to Suppress

DUI, Traffic Stop, Motion to Suppress
Sample DUI Traffic Stop Motion to Suppress
Motion to Suppress Evidence


“If the traffic stop is invalid, DUI Driving Under the Influence or other criminal charges can be avoided.


Sample DUI Traffic Stop Motion to Suppress


DUI cops need a valid reason for a traffic stop. In one recent case there was an anonymous tip of bad driving and then a video revealed no such bad driving. The video and other identifying information have been removed from the filing to protect the privacy of the defendant.

Was there a bad traffic stop in your case? Let’s find out – Call an experienced DUI Defense Attorney at 813-222-2220.




Take a look at this online sample Motion to Suppress based upon an allegation of an invalid DUI Traffic Stop. If the traffic stop is invalid, DUI Driving Under the Influence or other criminal charges can be avoided. Click below to see a Sample Motion to Suppress based upon an allegation of an invalid DUI Traffic Stop.


Sample Motion to Suppress DUI Traffic Stop



 

 

 
DUI Traffic Stop Motion to Suppress
DUI News

Florida DUI Statute of Limitations

 “A prosecution for a misdemeanor of the first degree must be commenced within 2 years after it is committed.”

dui, DUI Florida Attorney Lawyer, DUI Tampa, florida dui, florida dui attorney, florida dui lawyer, florida statute of limitations,
Statute of Limitations
Florida DUI
Statute of Limitations

Florida DUI Statute of Limitations

Florida DUI Statute of Limitations depends on the charge. In Florida, a second degree misdemeanor must commence within one year of the alleged incident. a first degree misdemeanor has two years to commence prosecution. First Degree felonies are 4 years and all other felonies are 3 years.

 


Statute of Limitations Running in Your Case?

 Call 813-222-2220

Take a look at Florida Statute 775.15.


775.15 Time limitations; general time limitations; exceptions.—
(1) A prosecution for a capital felony, a life felony, or a felony that resulted in a death may be commenced at any time. If the death penalty is held to be unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, all crimes designated as capital felonies shall be considered life felonies for the purposes of this section, and prosecution for such crimes may be commenced at any time.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, prosecutions for other offenses are subject to the following periods of limitation:
(a) A prosecution for a felony of the first degree must be commenced within 4 years after it is committed.
 
(b) A prosecution for any other felony must be commenced within 3 years after it is committed.
 
(c) A prosecution for a misdemeanor of the first degree must be commenced within 2 years after it is committed.
 
(d) A prosecution for a misdemeanor of the second degree or a noncriminal violation must be commenced within 1 year after it is committed.
(3) An offense is committed either when every element has occurred or, if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the course of conduct or the defendant’s complicity therein is terminated. Time starts to run on the day after the offense is committed.
(4)(a) Prosecution on a charge on which the defendant has previously been arrested or served with a summons is commenced by the filing of an indictment, information, or other charging document.
(b) A prosecution on a charge on which the defendant has not previously been arrested or served with a summons is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay. In determining what is reasonable, inability to locate the defendant after diligent search or the defendant’s absence from the state shall be considered. The failure to execute process on or extradite a defendant in another state who has been charged by information or indictment with a crime in this state shall not constitute an unreasonable delay.
(c) If, however, an indictment or information has been filed within the time period prescribed in this section and the indictment or information is dismissed or set aside because of a defect in its content or form after the time period has elapsed, the period for commencing prosecution shall be extended 3 months from the time the indictment or information is dismissed or set aside.
(5) The period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state. This provision shall not extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than 3 years, but shall not be construed to limit the prosecution of a defendant who has been timely charged by indictment or information or other charging document and who has not been arrested due to his or her absence from this state or has not been extradited for prosecution from another state.
(6) A prosecution for perjury in an official proceeding that relates to the prosecution of a capital felony may be commenced at any time.
(7) A prosecution for a felony that resulted in injury to any person, when such felony arises from the use of a “destructive device,” as defined in s. 790.001, may be commenced within 10 years.
(8) A prosecution for a felony violation of chapter 517 or s. 409.920 must be commenced within 5 years after the violation is committed.
(9) A prosecution for a felony violation of chapter 403 must be commenced within 5 years after the date of discovery of the violation.
(10) A prosecution for a felony violation of s. 825.102 or s. 825.103 must be commenced within 5 years after it is committed.
(11) A prosecution for a felony violation of ss. 440.105 and 817.234 must be commenced within 5 years after the violation is committed.
(12) If the period prescribed in subsection (2), subsection (8), subsection (9), subsection (10), or subsection (11) has expired, a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for:
(a) Any offense, a material element of which is either fraud or a breach of fiduciary obligation, within 1 year after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party or by a person who has a legal duty to represent an aggrieved party and who is himself or herself not a party to the offense, but in no case shall this provision extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than 3 years.
(b) Any offense based upon misconduct in office by a public officer or employee at any time when the defendant is in public office or employment, within 2 years from the time he or she leaves public office or employment, or during any time permitted by any other part of this section, whichever time is greater.
(13)(a) If the victim of a violation of s. 794.011, former s. 794.05, Florida Statutes 1995, s. 800.04, s. 826.04, or s. 847.0135(5) is under the age of 18, the applicable period of limitation, if any, does not begin to run until the victim has reached the age of 18 or the violation is reported to a law enforcement agency or other governmental agency, whichever occurs earlier. Such law enforcement agency or other governmental agency shall promptly report such allegation to the state attorney for the judicial circuit in which the alleged violation occurred. If the offense is a first or second degree felony violation of s. 794.011, and the offense is reported within 72 hours after its commission, the prosecution for such offense may be commenced at any time. This paragraph applies to any such offense except an offense the prosecution of which would have been barred by subsection (2) on or before December 31, 1984.
(b) If the offense is a first degree felony violation of s. 794.011 and the victim was under 18 years of age at the time the offense was committed, a prosecution of the offense may be commenced at any time. This paragraph applies to any such offense except an offense the prosecution of which would have been barred by subsection (2) on or before October 1, 2003.
(c) If the offense is a violation of s. 794.011 and the victim was under 16 years of age at the time the offense was committed, a prosecution of the offense may be commenced at any time. This paragraph applies to any such offense except an offense the prosecution of which would have been barred by subsection (2) on or before July 1, 2010.
(14) A prosecution for a first or second degree felony violation of s. 794.011, if the victim is 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense and the offense is reported to a law enforcement agency within 72 hours after commission of the offense, may be commenced at any time. If the offense is not reported within 72 hours after the commission of the offense, the prosecution must be commenced within the time periods prescribed in subsection (2).
(15)(a) In addition to the time periods prescribed in this section, a prosecution for any of the following offenses may be commenced within 1 year after the date on which the identity of the accused is established, or should have been established by the exercise of due diligence, through the analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence, if a sufficient portion of the evidence collected at the time of the original investigation and tested for DNA is preserved and available for testing by the accused:
1. An offense of sexual battery under chapter 794.
2. A lewd or lascivious offense under s. 800.04 or s. 825.1025.
(b) This subsection applies to any offense that is not otherwise barred from prosecution between July 1, 2004, and June 30, 2006.
(16)(a) In addition to the time periods prescribed in this section, a prosecution for any of the following offenses may be commenced at any time after the date on which the identity of the accused is established, or should have been established by the exercise of due diligence, through the analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence, if a sufficient portion of the evidence collected at the time of the original investigation and tested for DNA is preserved and available for testing by the accused:
1. Aggravated battery or any felony battery offense under chapter 784.
2. Kidnapping under s. 787.01 or false imprisonment under s. 787.02.
3. An offense of sexual battery under chapter 794.
4. A lewd or lascivious offense under s. 800.04, s. 825.1025, or s. 847.0135(5).
5. A burglary offense under s. 810.02.
6. A robbery offense under s. 812.13, s. 812.131, or s. 812.135.
7. Carjacking under s. 812.133.
8. Aggravated child abuse under s. 827.03.
(b) This subsection applies to any offense that is not otherwise barred from prosecution on or after July 1, 2006.

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130 Ways to Go to Jail in Traffic Court | Florida Criminal Traffic Charges | Complete List

TRAF, Criminal Traffic Charges, List, DUI, DWLSR,
Florida Criminal Traffic
Charges List

Florida Criminal Traffic Charges | Complete List

 

There are at least 130 ways to be charged with a criminal traffic crime under Florida law. Many traffic charges are non-criminal civil infractions that involve points on the driver’s license and possible increased insurance rates. 



 130 Ways to 
Go to Jail in Traffic Court

 


This is a complete list of criminal traffic charges under Florida Statutes. The list includes the Form Code used by police, The Florida Statute section number, the level of the crime (felony or misdemeanor), and an abbreviated description of the charge.

 

Florida Criminal Penalties for Traffic Charges Summary


Felony Criminal Traffic Charges may be sentenced as follows:

  • 1st degree Felony 30 years in Prison “For a felony of the first degree, by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 30 years or, when specifically provided by statute, by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment.”
  • 2nd degree Felony Fifteen years in Prison “For a felony of the second degree, by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 15 years.”
  • 3rd Degree Felony Five years in Prison “For a felony of the third degree, by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 5 years.” 
 

Misdemeanor Criminal Traffic Charges may be sentenced as follows:

  • 1st degree Misdemeanor – 1 year Jail “For a misdemeanor of the first degree, by a definite term of imprisonment not exceeding 1 year;” 
  • 2nd degree Misdemeanor – 60 days Jail “For a misdemeanor of the second degree, by a definite term of imprisonment not exceeding 60 days.” 

Complete List of Florida Criminal Traffic Crimes and Penalties


 

Form Code
Statute
Level
Degree
Charge Description
Traf1007
316.193.4 2b
Fel
3rd
Driving Under Influence Over 0.15 (Multi Conv)
Traf1008
316.193.3c14
Fel
3rd
Driving Under The Influence W/Property  Damage
Misd
1st
Misd
2nd
Misd
2nd
Traf1016
316.193.1 4
Misd
1st
Driving Under The Influence Accompanied By Per
Traf1018
316.193.12b3
Fel
3rd
Driving Under The Influence 4th Or Subsequent
Traf1019
316.1933.C12a
Misd
1st
Dui W Prop Damage Or Persnl Injury 2nd Conv
Traf1025
316.1933.C12b
Fel
3rd
Dui With Property Damage Or Personal Injury  M
Traf1025
316.1933.C12b
Fel
3rd
Dui With Property Damage Or Personal Injury  M
Traf1028
316.193.3c1
Misd
1st
Dui With Property Damage Or Personal Injury
Traf1029
316.193.12b2
Misd
1st
Driving Under The Influence  Third Conviction
Misd
1st
Traf1038
316.193.12a
Fel
3rd
Dui – 3rd Conviction
Traf1049
316.193.3
Fel
2nd
Dui Manslaughter
Traf1055
316.193.2b
Fel
3rd
Driving Under The Influence Third Or Subsequen
Traf1058
316.193.3c2
Fel
3rd
Dui With Serious Bodily Injury
Traf1063
316.191.2a
Misd
1st
Unlawful Racing On Highway
Traf1068
316.1933.Abc3
Fel
2nd
Dui Manslaughter
Traf1072
316.193.3c3b
Fel
1st
Dui Manslaughter Failure To Render Aid
Traf1073
316.193.3c3b
Fel
1st
Dui Manslaughter Leaving The Scene
Misd
1st
Traf2012
316.027.1a
Fel
3rd
Leaving Scene Of A Crash With Injury
Traf2014
316.027.1b
Fel
1st
Leaving The Scene Of A Crash With Death
Traf2022
316.061.1
Misd
2nd
Leaving The Scene Of A Crash With Property Dam
Traf2030
316.063.1
Misd
2nd
Leaving Scene Of Accident  Unattended Property
Traf3010
316.067.
Misd
2nd
False Report
Traf3020
316.072.3
Misd
2nd
Disobeying A Police Officer
Traf3021
316.072.3
Misd
2nd
Disobeying A Fire Department Official
Traf3022
316.0775.
Misd
2nd
Interference Traffic Control Device 200 Or Les
Traf3023
316.0775.
Misd
1st
Interfere W/Traf Contr Device >$200 But <$1000
Traf3030
316.192.
Misd
2nd
Reckless Driving
Traf3032
316.192.32
Fel
3rd
Reckless Driving With Serious Bodily Injury
Traf3033
316.192.3
Misd
1st
Reckless Driving With Property Damage Or Perso
Traf3037
316.1935.4a
Fel
2nd
Aggravated Fleeing To Elude
Traf3038
316.1935.4b
Fel
1st
Aggravated Fleeing To Elude  Serious Bodily In
Traf3039
316.1935.1
Fel
3rd
Fleeing And Attempting To Elude A Police Offic
Traf3044
316.1935.2
Fel
3rd
Felony Fleeing To Elude
Traf3046
316.2935.1a5a
Misd
1st
Offering For Sale A Tampered Motor Vehicle
Traf3047
316.1935.3a
Fel
2nd
Fleeing To Elude Highspeed
Traf3048
316.1935.3b
Fel
1st
Fleeing To Elude Highspeed  Serious Bodily Inj
Traf3050
316.646.4
Misd
1st
False Proof Of Insurance
Traf3080
316.80.
Fel
3rd
Unlawful Conveyance Of Fuel
Traf3090
316.302.11
Misd
1st
Commercial Vehicle Bearing False Identificatio
Traf4011
318.14.3
Misd
2nd
Failure To Accept Traffic Citation
Traf4020
319.34.
Misd
2nd
Transfer Or Use Of Vehicle W/O Certificate
Traf4110
319.30.5b
Fel
3rd
Possession Of Vin Plate
Traf4130
319.30.4
Fel
3rd
Poss Of Motor Vehicle With Vin Plate Removed
Traf4140
319.30.2c3
Fel
3rd
Failure To Comply With Derelict Motor Vehicle
Traf4312
319.33.1b
Fel
3rd
Knowingly Use Altered Or Forged Title
Traf4313
319.33.1c
Fel
3rd
Fraudulently Obtain Motor Vehicle Title
Traf4314
319.33.1d
Fel
3rd
Sell Or Possess Vehicle With Altered Numbers
Traf4315
319.33.1e
Fel
3rd
False Statement In Title Transfer
Traf4316
319.33.4
Fel
3rd
Possession Of Stolen Motor Vehicle Ownership D
Traf4320
319.33.2
Fel
3rd
Obtain Goods With Invalid Vehicle Title
Traf4350
319.33.5
Fel
3rd
Possession Of Counterfeit Motor Vehicle Title
Traf4360
319.35.1a
Fel
3rd
Odometer Fraud
Traf4360
319.35.1a
Fel
3rd
Odometer Fraud
Traf4365
319.35.1b
Fel
3rd
Misstatement Of Odometer Reading
Traf4400
319.14.25
Misd
2nd
Sale Of Vehicle Without Revealing Prior Use
Traf5015
320.02.1
Misd
2nd
Operating Unregistered Vehicle
Traf5017
320.02.6
Misd
2nd
Motor Vehicle Registration By False Representa
Traf5019
320.02.4
Misd
2nd
Failure To Notify Dhsmv Of Change Of Address
Traf5022
320.07.3c
Misd
2nd
Expired Tag 2nd Offense
Traf5031
320.131.5
Misd
1st
Misuse Of Temporary Tag
Traf5032
320.131.3
Misd
2nd
Unlawful Issue Or Use Of A Temporary Tag   Exp
Traf5040
320.261.
Misd
2nd
Attaching Tag Not Assigned
Traf5050
320.27.2
Misd
2nd
Selling Motor Vehicles Without License
Traf5055
320.27.6
Misd
2nd
Failure To Keep Motor Vehicle Records
Traf5056
320.27.7
Misd
2nd
Failure Of Dealer To Obtain Title
Traf5060
320.26.1a
Fel
3rd
Sale Of License Tag Or Validation Stickers
Traf5061
Violate Nonresident Vehicle Registratio Req
Traf5065
319.22.5
Misd
1st
Transfer Of Open Title
Traf5070
320.061.
Misd
2nd
Alteration Of License Plates
Traf5080
320.0848.7
Misd
2nd
Unlawful Display Of Disabled Parking Permit
Traf5080
320.0848.7
Misd
2nd
Unlawful Display Of Disabled Parking Permit
Traf5085
320.084.87
Misd
2nd
Unlawful Use Of  -Disabled Parking Permit
Traf5099
322.03.1
Misd
2nd
No Valid Drivers License
Traf6002
322.18.8e
Misd
2nd
Possession Of Forged License Extension Sticker
Traf6003
322.03.5
Misd
2nd
Expired Drivers License   More Than 4 Months
Traf6004
322.03.4
Misd
2nd
No Valid License Motorcycle
Traf6006
Viol Of Nonresident Driver License Requirement
Traf6010
322.051.6a
Misd
2nd
Displaying Fraudulent Id Card
Traf6013
322.051.6b
Misd
2nd
Lending Identification Card To Another
Traf6014
322.051.6c
Misd
2nd
Unlawful Display Of Identification Card
Traf6020
322.16.
Misd
2nd
Violation Of Restricted License
Traf6027
False Statement In Obtaining A Drivers License
Traf6029
322.212.5c
Fel
3rd
Possession Of Altered Or Non-Designated Driver
Traf6032
322.212.2
Fel
3rd
Unlawful Transfer Of Driver
Traf6033
322.212.2
Fel
3rd
Unlawful Transfer Of Identification Card
Traf6034
322.212.3
Fel
3rd
Unlawful Issuance Of Driver
Traf6035
322.212.3
Fel
3rd
Unlawful Issuance Of Identification Card
Traf6036
322.212.4
Fel
3rd
Aiding In Unlawful Supplying Of Drivers Licens
Traf6037
322.212.4
Fel
3rd
Aiding In Unlawful Supplying Of Id Card
Traf6039
322.212.1a
Fel
3rd
Unauthorized Use Or Possession Of Drivers Lice
Traf6041
322.32.2
Misd
2nd
Lending Drivers License
Traf6042
322.32.1
Misd
2nd
Unlawful Use Of Canceled License
Traf6043
322.32.3
Misd
2nd
Unlawful Display Of License
Traf6044
322.32.6
Misd
2nd
Application For Drivers License In Different N
Traf6045
322.212.1b
Fel
3rd
Sale Or Delivery Of Forged Driver?S License Or
Traf6045
322.212.1b
Fel
3rd
Sale/Delivery Of Forged Drivers Lic Or Id Card
Traf6051
322.30.
Misd
2nd
Driving With Foreign License While Suspended
Traf6052
322.32.4
Misd
2nd
Failure To Surrender Suspended License
Traf6053
322.34.6
Fel
3rd
Driving While License Cancelled Susp Revoked
Traf6054
322.34.6
Fel
3rd
Driv. W/O Valid Driv. W/Death Or Seri. Bod Inj
Traf6057
322.34.2
Misd
1st
Drive While D.L. Can/Sus/Rev (Habitual Offende
Traf6058
322.34.7a
Misd
1st
Driving A Commercial Vehicle While License Can
Traf6060
322.36.
Misd
2nd
Permitting Unauthorized Person To Drive
Traf6065
322.57.4a
Misd
1st
No Valid Commercial Drivers License
Traf6075
322.34.2a
Misd
2nd
Driving W/License Canc Susp  Or Revoked
Traf6076
322.34.2b
Misd
1st
Driving W/License Canc Susp Or Revoked-2nd Off
Traf6077
322.34.2c
Fel
3rd
Drive While License Canc Susp Revoked 3rd Off
Traf6078
322.34.5
Fel
3rd
Driving While License Revoked-Habitual Offendr
Traf6079
322.341.
Fel
3rd
Driving While License Permanently Revoked
Traf6080
322.34.10
Misd
1st
2nd Driving While License Canceled Suspended O
Traf6081
322.34.10
Misd
2nd
Driving While License Canceled Suspended Or Re
Traf6090
Permitting Unauthorized Minor To Drive
Traf6131
322.212.1a
Fel
3rd
Unauthorized Use Or Possession Of A  Fraudulen
Traf6134
322.212.1b
Fel
3rd
False Driver
Traf6136
322.212.1c
Fel
3rd
False Identification Card
Traf6137
322.212.5b
Misd
2nd
Poss. Drivers License With Altered Dob
Traf6138
322.212.5b
Misd
2nd
Poss. Of Identification Card With Altered Dob
Traf6200
322.57.2
Misd
2nd
Motorcycle Driver’s License
Traf6999
Violation Of Financial Responsibility Law
Traf7000
324.201.1
Misd
2nd
Failure To Return License Or Registration
Traf7001
324.221.3
Misd
1st
Improper Tag With Suspended License
Traf7002
324.022.
Misd
2nd
Failure To Have Property Damage Insurance
Traf7010
327.35.1a
Misd
1st
Vessel Dui
Traf8050
375.314.
Misd
2nd
Damaging Public Lands

 

Source: http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&URL=0700-0799/0775/Sections/0775.082.html